freestone and Zahar climate law 4 (2014) 1-3 gas emissions and support less wealthy nations, through the provision of necessary resources, to engage in adaptation and mitigation actions. But one is hard-pressed to name any other substantive rules that are distinctively international 'climate law' . Individual state mitigation obligations under the Convention itself, as opposed to the Kyoto Protocol, remain largely inchoate.
In the domestic sphere, although the obligations developed by the European Union are crucially important, it is true that elsewhere there are vast jurisdictional expanses (like the United States at the federal level, and notwithstanding the Obama administration's determined efforts under Clean Air Act) that could be described as largely 'climate-law-free' . The greatest number of countries (that is, the great majority of non-Annex I parties to the Convention) have no climate mitigation laws at all; statutes dealing explicitly with adaptation are more common, but still rare.
Even where highly elaborate domestic climate laws have been developed, they do not necessarily have any normative traction; which is to say that the law can be dismantled, as is happening now with Australia's barelyimplemented climate laws, from one year to the next, following a change of government. Many climate laws of Annex I parties to the Convention are only potential engines of change, idling in place while they await a breakthrough at the international level to power them into action.
The major part of the international regime for climate law comes of course from the Convention, its Kyoto Protocol, and all the decisions emanating from twenty years of cops and a decade of cop/mops. We have seen the establishment of a number of new institutions through this process, including, most recently the Green Climate Fund with its base in Incheon, South Korea. What eludes the parties, however, is the comprehensive multilateral agreement first scheduled for Copenhagen in 2009 and now for Paris in 2015. In the meantime, commentators will be following the 2014 Lima cop anxiously to assess the likelihood of a major breakthrough in the negotiations. Unfortunately at this point, such a breakthrough, while earnestly to be wished, does not seem more likely than it did to those who followed the evolution (or convolution) of the negotiating text in the lead-up to the Copenhagen conference in 2009. The impact of politics on climate law is still much larger than it is on settled areas of the law-even other environmental law.
Undoubtedly some will have a different take on the current state of climate law. One could reasonably defend a position that there is more climate law (or less of it) than we have suggested here, and entertain a different degree of optimism about the expected Paris Agreement, but few would take issue with the statement that this is a developing area of both international and domestic law.
